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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two essays: the first investigates informed trading in the
Chinese stock exchanges, and the second examines the persistency of correlation of currency
future prices.
For the first essay, using a sample of Chinese firms dual-listed in both the China
mainland stock exchange and the Hong Kong stock exchange, I investigate the two types of
informed trading - insider trading and trading derived from better analysis in the A-and H-share
markets. The results suggest that H-shares have relatively more informed trading based on better
analysis. In addition, the results from the firm size regression can also be seen as indirect
evidence that larger firms tend to have trading with better analysis and less insider trading. These
patterns are also confirmed in the sub-period analysis. However, I find no significant relation
between informed trading and the relative pricing of A- and H-shares.
For the second essay I examine the dynamic correlation between currency futures prices,
focusing on the persistency of correlation of currency prices. Using the Dynamic Conditional
Correlation model developed by Engle (2002), this study incorporates time-varying correlations
into the analysis. The sample includes eight currency futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange from 1999 to 2008 and the U.S. dollar index future. The study finds that the Canadian
dollar has the greater persistency while the Brazilian real has the weakest. No less important, the
study finds that the time-varying conditional correlation between currency futures and the U.S.
dollar futures is influenced by two types of liquidity: price impacts (Amihud illiquidity) and the
logarithm of trading volume.
Keywords: informed trading, A- and H-shares, insider trading, currency futures, persistency,
Amihud illiquidity
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Chapter 1
Analyzing Informed Trading in Dually-Listed Chinese Stocks
1. Introduction

Informed trading can come from insider information or from better analysis, yet to my
knowledge there is no study in the literature that empirically separates the two. This study
attempts to do so by analyzing a large number of Chinese firms dual-listed in both the mainland
Chinese exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges) and the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. This set of firms presents a natural experiment since, relative to the mainland markets,
there is no doubt that the Hong Kong market is associated with less insider trading. So, in
addition to understanding the extent of informed trading in China, China’s unique setting has the
potential to increase the understanding of two aspects of informed trading – insider trading and
trading derived from better analysis. An added advantage of this analysis is that because the
same set of firms is being analyzed, firm characteristics do not need to be controlled. Specifically,
I investigate the two types of informed trading - insider trading and trading from better analysis
in the A-and H-share markets, based on the methodology developed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar,
and Wang (2002). The method primarily utilizes the relation between daily volume and first
order return autocorrelation for individual stocks in order to infer the extent of informed trading.
Intuitively, informed trading causes prices to change permanently and tends to be positively
correlated with price changes; on the other hand, uninformed trading has only a temporary effect
on prices and tends to be negatively associated with price changes. While Llorente, Michaely,
Saar, and Wang (2002) analyze U.S. stocks, it does not empirically separate the two aspects of
informed trading.
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Given the assumptions that the A-shares market has more insider trading and that it has
not increased over time, my results suggest that H-shares have relatively more informed trading
based on better analysis. In other word, there is relatively more trading motivated by better
analysis in the H-shares market. Together with results from a firm size regression, the
implication is that larger firms tend to have more trading with better analysis and less insider
trading. While this conclusion seems intuitive, to my knowledge this is the first study that
explicitly analyzes the relation between firm size and aspects of informed trading.
I further examine the different aspects of informed trading by dividing the sample period
into two sub-periods. More specifically, I examine the changes in coefficients of informed
trading in the two subsequent sample periods. The sub-period results further confirm that Hshares have relatively more informed trading based on better analysis: since insider trading
should not have increased, the substantial increase in the coefficients for informed trading of Hshares represents further evidence that trading based on better analysis dominates in the H-share
market. This makes sense because the Hong Kong market has a long experience in analyzing
stocks, but initially investors in Hong Kong might have difficulty evaluating Chinese firms with
a host of transparency and political issues. The relatively small increase in the coefficients for
informed trading of A-shares is indirect evidence that stock valuation has not substantially
improved over time in A-shares. That is, it has implication for the changes in the Chinese
investment environment.
One related question arising for cross-listed securities is whether informed trading in both
the A- and H-share markets impacts the relative pricing of A-and H-shares. If H-shares have
higher informed trading coefficients, suggesting that there is relative more trading motivated by
better analysis in the H-shares market, than these better analyses will bring the stock price more
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in line to its intrinsic value. On the other hand, given the fact that the A-shares market tends to
have excess speculative trading or insiders trading, the price might deviate more from its
intrinsic value. Therefore, I expect that informed trading coefficients for H-shares are negatively
correlated with the average H-share discount, while informed coefficients for A-shares are
positively correlated with the H-share discount. However, the empirical results indicate no
significant relation between informed trading on the relative pricing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature
review, Section 3 provides some background information concerning share structure in China,
Section 4 describes data and methodology, Section 5 presents empirical results, and Section 6
gives the conclusion.
2. Literature Review
There are relatively few theoretical studies on trading volume, with few exceptions such
as Wang (1994) and Campbell, Grossman, Wang (1993). Wang (1994) proposes a model of
competitive stock trading. In this model, investors are heterogeneous in their information and
private investment opportunities and rationally trade for both informational and noninformational motives. The author examines the link between the nature of heterogeneity among
investors and the behavior of trading volume and its relation to price dynamics and finds that
volume is positively correlated with absolute change in prices and dividends. He further shows
that informational trading and non-informational trading lead to different dynamic relations
between trading volume and stock returns. Campbell, Grossman, Wang (1993), on the other hand,
investigate the relationship between aggregate stock market trading volume and the serial
correlation of daily stock returns. For both stock indexes and individual large stocks they find the
first order daily return autocorrelation tends to decline with volume. They explain this finding
3

using a model in which risk-averse market makers accommodate buying or selling pressure from
liquidity for non-informational traders and reward by changing expected stock returns. The other
implication for the paper is that a stock price that declines on a high volume day is more likely
than a stock price that declines on a low volume day to be associated with an increase in the
expected stock return.
Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) and Bamber, Baron, and Stober (1999)
investigate other aspects of trading. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) investigate the idea
that extreme trading activity contains information about future evolution of stock prices and find
that stocks experiencing unusually high (low) trading volume over a week tend to appreciate
(depreciated). Over the course of the following months, they argue that this high volume return
premium is consistent with the idea that shocks in the trading activity of a stock affect its
visibility and in turn the subsequent demand and price for that stock. Bamber, Baron, and Stober
(1999) in contrast, provide evidence that differential interpretations are an important stimulus for
speculative trading. They find two conditions under which differential interpretations play a
significant role in explaining trading: 1) they present empirical evidence supporting Kandel and
Pearson (1995) arguing that trading coincident with small price changes reflects investor’s
differential interpretations of information. This evidence is important because it is inconsistent
with conventional models of trade that assume homogeneous interpretations and 2) they also find
that differential interpretations explain a significant amount of the trading occurring in a sample
where trading volume is higher than the firm specific announcement period average. This is
consistent with informed traders acting on their differential interpretations when there is enough
liquidity training to help camouflage their own information based trades.
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Stickel and Verrecchia (1994) test the hypothesis that price changes are more likely to
reverse following weak volume support than strong volume support. Since price changes reflect
demand for a stock and therefore higher volume reflects a greater likelihood that demand
originates from informed rather than uninformed trade. Consequently, as volume increases the
probability that price change is informationally driven increases as well. There evidence suggests
that a large price change on days with weak volume support tends to reverse the next day. They
point out this volume effect is reinforced by, yet independent of, a bid-ask bounce effect.
However, returns do not reverse following days of strong volume support. In fact, a large price
increase with strong volume support tends to be followed by another price increase the next day.
Kandel and Pearson (1995), present evidence on the volume return relationship around earnings
announcement and argue that it is inconsistent with models that agents have identical
interpretations of the public announcement. They also provided additional evidence on revisions
on analyst forecasts which is also inconsistent with identical interpretations.
Chae (2005) and Lee and Rui (2002) provide further empirical evidence regarding stock
volume. Chae (2005) investigates trading volume before scheduled and unscheduled corporate
announcements to explore how traders respond to private information. The author shows that
cumulative trading volume decreases by more than 15% prior to scheduled announcements. The
decline in trading volume is largest when information asymmetry is high, while the opposite
relation holds for volume after the announcement. In contrast, trading volume before
unscheduled announcements increases dramatically and shows little relation to proxies for
information asymmetry. The author argues all the results for scheduled announcements are
consistent with asymmetric information series, where discretionary liquidity traders decrease
volume when they know there is much adverse selection. However, discretionary liquidity
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traders do not seem to read information embedded in prices for before unscheduled
announcements. In addition, market makers act appropriately by increasing price sensitivity
before all announcements. This implies that market makers extract timing information from their
order books. Lee and Rui (2002), however, examine the dynamic relations between stock market
trading volume and returns (and volatility) for both domestic and cross-county markets by using
the daily data of the three largest stock markets: New York, Tokyo, and London. Their major
findings are as follows: 1) trading volume does not cause stock market returns on each of three
stock markets 2) there exist a positive feedback relationship between trading volume and return
volatility in all three markets 3) regarding the cross-country relationship U.S. financial market
variables, in particular U.S. trading volume, contains an extensive predictive power for U.K. and
Japanese market variables and 4) sub-sample analysis shows evidence of stronger spillover
effects after the 1987 market crash and increased important of trading volume as an information
variable after the introduction of options in the U.S. and Japan.
Also, there are several papers that deal with the dynamics of returns and volume. Gagnon
and Karolyi (2009) investigate the joint dynamics of returns and trading volume of 556 stocks on
the U.S. market. They use heterogeneous trading models rationalize how trading volume reflects
trading quality of trader’s information signals an how it helps to disentangle whether returns are
associated with portfolio rebalancing trades or information motivated trades. Based on these
models they hypothesize that returns in the home (U.S.) market on high volume days are more
likely to continue to spill over into the U.S. (home) market for those cross-listed stocks subject to
the risk of greater informed trading. Their empirical findings provided support for these
predictions, which confirms the link between information trading volume and international stock
return co-movements. Halling, Moulton and Panayides (2011) introduce a volume-based
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measure of multimarket trading to study the extent to which investors actively exploit
multimarket environments. By analyzing a large set of cross-listed firms, they find higher
multimarket trading among markets with similar designs and strong enforcement of insider
trading laws and for firms with higher institutional ownership. These findings are important for
firms evaluating the benefits of cross-listing and for markets competing for order flow.
Menkveld (2008) studies British cross-listed stocks and finds evidence of multimarket trading
even after controlling for the possibility of local traders in each market simultaneously receiving
the same private signal and trading on it locally. Chen, Firth, and Rui (2001), in contrast,
examine the dynamic relation between returns, volume, and volatility of stock indexes. Using the
data from nine national markets spent over two decades they show that a positive correlation
between trading volume and the absolute value of the stock price change. They also demonstrate
that for some countries returns causes volume and volume causes returns. Their results indicate
that trading volume contributes some information to the trading process.
Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) also examine the dynamic relation between
return and volume of individual stocks. Using a simple model in which investors trade in order to
either share risk or speculate on private information, they show that returns generated by risksharing trades tend to reverse themselves while returns generated by speculative trades tend to
continue onward. They test this theoretical prediction by analyzing the relation between daily
volume and first-order return autocorrelation for individual stocks listed on the NYSE and
AMEX. They conclude that the cross-sectional variation in the relation between volume and
return autocorrelations are related to the extent of informed trading.
Jayaraman (2008) examines whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than
cash flows provide or garble information. Consistent with theories that predict more informed
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trading when public information is less informative, the author finds that bid-ask spreads and the
probability of informed trading are higher both when earnings are smoother than cash flows and
also when earnings are more volatile than cash flows. Additional tests suggest that managers'
discretionary choices that lead to smoother or more volatile earnings than cash flows garble
information, on average. Perottiand and Thadden (2003) argue that dominant investors can
influence the publicly available information about firms by affecting the cost of information
collection. They suggest that under strategic competition, transparency results in higher
variability of profits and output. Thus, lenders prefer less transparency since this protects firms in
a weak competitive position, while equity holders prefer more transparency. Market interaction
creates strategic complementarity in gathering information on competing firms and thus entry by
transparent competitors will improve price information. Moreover, as the return to information
gathering increases with liquidity, increasing global trading may undermine the ability of bank
control to keep firms opaque. Bardong, Bartram, and Yadav (2009) investigate and test
hypotheses on how informed trading varies with market-wide factors and the structural and
trading characteristics of a firm. They find strong evidence of commonality in informed trading,
and a systematic dependence of informed trading on firm characteristics that is largely consistent
with intuition and earlier theory and empirical evidence, wherever available. They then
decompose informed trading into two components: one that reflects information asymmetry with
respect to skilled information processors with potentially private information on systematic
factors, who generate a private informational advantage using public data; and another
unpredictable component that reflects truly private information, potentially of traditional insiders.
They test the pricing relevance of both these components and find that it is only the predictable
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component reflecting truly private information that is priced, and is priced more strongly and in a
manner more robust than total informed trading.
Lastly, there are several papers than examine information and stocks. Chen, Kim,
Nofsinger, and Rui (2007) study investment decision making in an emerging market by
examining single brokerage account data from China. Overall, they find that Chinese investors
make poor trading decisions. The stocks they purchase tend to underperform those they sell.
They also find that Chinese investors suffer from three behavioral biases: (i) they tend to sell
stocks that have appreciated in price, but not those that have depreciated in price (consistent with
a disposition effect - acknowledging gains but not losses), (ii) they seem overconfident, and (iii)
they appear to believe that past returns are indicative of future returns (a representativeness bias).
In comparisons to prior findings, Chinese investors appear more overconfident than U.S.
investors (i.e., Chinese investors hold fewer stocks, yet trade more often) and seem to suffer
from a stronger disposition effect. Finally, the authors categorize Chinese investors, based on
proxy measures of experience, and find that ‘‘experienced’’ investors are not always less prone
to behavioral biases than are ‘‘inexperienced’’ ones. In contrast, Karolyi and Li (2003) find that
there is a negative relationship between firm size and information asymmetry and that there is
also a statistically significant relationship between variations in B-share discount and firm size.
Sun and Tong (2000) look at the relative volatility of B-share and A-share returns. They argue
that since both A- and B-stocks represent the same claim to a firm’s assets, any excess A-share
volatility (comparing to that of B-share) must be due to speculative trading and therefore
associated with A-share premiums. Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) employ a variance ratio of returns
to A- and B-shares in order to investigate changes in risk preferences. They do not find a
statistically significant connection between levels of risk and B-share discounts.
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3. Background Information
China began to open its economy in the late 1970’s. After successfully liberalizing farm
ownership and production China began to shift focus and start building stronger financial
markets by opening the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.1 Most of
the original companies listed on the two exchanges were state-owned enterprises. The first shares
traded on the exchanges were A-shares. A-shares are denominated in Renminbi (RMB) and
issued to local citizens. By 1992 the two exchanges expanded trading by issuing B-shares, which
were sold specifically to foreigners and denominated in U.S. dollars.
In contrast, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange had been operating for almost a century.
China knew of Hong Kong’s ability to raise large amount of capital within Asia and soon
approached the exchange with an offer to have Chinese mainland businesses directly listed on
the Hong Kong Exchange. The Hong Kong Exchange agreed, and since Hong Kong begins with
the letter “H” the new shares were denoted as H-shares.
H-shares are stocks traded on the Hong Kong stock market and denominated in Hong
Kong dollars. In order to sell H-shares companies must meet certain requirements: (1) the
company must be incorporated in mainland China; (2) the company must have a market
capitalization of HK $200 million; (3) the company must have earned, 3 years prior to
application, a profit of HK $5 billion; this means a profit of HK $2 billion the year before the
application and a total profit of HK $3 billion the two years prior to that; and (4) during the 3
year period prior to application management must have remained unchanged.

1

Shenzhen was designated by the state as a special economic zone in 1980. Shenzhen was originally a part of the city of
Guangdong.
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A-shares generally trade at a premium to H-shares. This might be partially due to the fact
that the Chinese government restricts mainland Chinese from investing abroad and foreigners,
located in mainland China, from investing in the H-share market. For mainland Chinese, there
are three ways for individual investors to invest in H-shares: (1) individual investors can travel to
Hong Kong to set up an account in Hong Kong to buy H-shares; (2) individual investors can buy
H-shares through Hong Kong brokerage companies that have offices in China; (3) in selected
cities, individual investors can purchase H-shares using a special service called “H-share Express”
provided by the Bank of China.
Table 1 Panel A shows the difference in stock exchange and investor types for A- and HShare Markets. Table 1 Panel B reports the deceptive statistics for the two markets. In 2011, the
GDP for China mainland is 6.989 trillion USD vs. for Hong Kong market 242.4 billion USD. For
the Shanghai Stock Exchange the market capitalization is 2.357 trillion USD vs. Hong Kong
stock exchange 2.258 trillion USD. As of 2011, there were 1,961companies listed on China’s
mainland stock exchange vs. 1,496 companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The
value of shares traded for China mainland is 3,670,156 million USD vs. 1,444,712 million USD
for Hong Kong. In addition, there are 1,273,276.900 trades happening in China mainland vs.
168,524,300 trades for Hong Kong. As for the number of shares traded, China mainland is
2,119,387 million vs. Hong Kong’s 2,953,186 million. The average daily turnover dollar value
for China mainland is 15,042 million USD while Hong Kong has 5.873 million USD. Further,
the average value of trades for China mainland is 2,900 USD vs. 8600 USD for the Hong Kong
market. In sum, relative to size of the economy, Hong Kong has a slightly larger stock market,
more number of shares traded, lower turnover ratio, larger trade size, and greater trade value - all
of which are characteristics of a more liquid market.

11

Table 1. A- and H-Share Markets Comparison
Panel A. Difference between A- and H-Share Markets
A-share

H-share

Stock Exchange

Shanghai (SSE)
Shenzhen (SZSE)

Hong Kong (HKEx)

Currency

RMB

HKD

Investor

Chinese mainland
investor

HK residents, foreigners,
some Chinese mainland
investor

Panel B. Descriptive A- and H-Share Market
China mainland
Shanghai

Hong Kong

GDP

US$6.989 trillion

US$242.4 Billion

Market Capitalization

US$2.357 trillion

US$2.258 trillion

NO. Companies Listed

1691 (931)

1,496

Value of share trading
(Total) ($millions)

3,670,155.70

1,444,711.70

Number of trades
(thousands)

1,273,276.90

168,524.30

Number of shares traded
(millions)

2,119,387.10

2,953,185.80

Average daily turnover
value ($millions)

15,041.60

5,872.80

Average value of trades
($thousands)

2.9

8.6

4. Data and Methodology
The initial sample is constructed using all cross-listed A- and H-shares in both the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period 2003 to 2011. For a firm to be included
in the sample it must have daily price data, daily trading volume, and shares outstanding data
available for both the A-and H-share market. The final sample covers 68 firms and spans from
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January 1st, 2003 to December 31st, 2011. Table 2 reports the sample firms and their respective
industries for the A- and H-shares markets.
Table 2. Sample of Companies
This table provides the basic information for the dual-listed A- and H-shares included in the sample. Column 1 provides the name
of the company; column 2 provides the respective industry.
Company Name

Industry

ZTECorporation

Communications and Related Equipment Manufacturing

Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science And Technology Co., Ltd.

Special Equipment Manufacturing

Weichai Power Co., Ltd.

Transportation Equipment Manufacturing

Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Ltd.

Paper and Allied Products

Northeast Electric Development Co., Ltd.

Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing

Jingwei Textile Machinery Co., Ltd.

Special Equipment Manufacturing

Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.

Medicine Manufacturing

Angang Steel Company Limited

Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding

HisenseKelon Electrical Holdings Company Limited

Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing

Xinjiang GoldwindScience&TechnologyCo.,Ltd

Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing

Shandong Molong Petroleum Machinery Co. Ltd.

Special Equipment Manufacturing

BYD Co., Ltd

Other Manufacturing

Huaneng Power International Co., Ltd

Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and
Supply

Anhui Expressway Co., Ltd

Support Service for Transportation

China Minsheng Banking Co., Ltd.

Banking

China Shipping Development Co., Ltd

Water Transportation

Huadian Power International Co., Ltd.

Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and
Supply

China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation

Oil and Gas Extraction

China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd

Air Transportation

China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd

Banking

China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd.

Air Transportation

Yanzhou Coal Mining Co., Ltd.

Coal Mining and Quarrying

Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.

Medicine Manufacturing
Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting, Rolling, Drawing, and
Extruding

Jiangxi Copper Co., Ltd.
Jiangsu Expressway Co., Ltd

Support Service for Transportation

Shenzhen Expressway Co., Ltd

Support Service for Transportation

Anhui Conch Cement Co.,Ltd

Non-metallic Mineral Products

Tsingtao Brewery Co., Ltd.

Beverages

Guangzhou Shipyard International Co., Ltd.

Transportation Equipment Manufacturing

Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co., Ltd.

Petroleum Processing & Coking

Nanjing Panda Electronics Co., Ltd.

Communications and Related Equipment Manufacturing

Shenji Group Kunming Machine Tool Co.,Ltd

Special Equipment Manufacturing
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Maanshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.

Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding

Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd.

Special Equipment Manufacturing

Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co., Ltd.

Chemical Fibre Manufacturing

Tianjin Capital Environmental Protectiongroup Co., Ltd.

Public Facilities Services

Dongfang Electric Corporation Limited

Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing

Luoyang Glass Co., Ltd.

Non-metallic Mineral Products

Chongqing Iron & Steel Company Limited

Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding

China Shenhua Energy Company Limited

Coal Mining and Quarrying

Sichuan Expressway Company Limited

Support Service for Transportation

Air China Limited

Air Transportation

China Railway Construction Corporation Limited

Civil Engineering Construction

Agricultural Bank Of China Limited

Banking

Ping An Insurance (Group) Company Of China, Ltd.

Insurance

Bank Of Communications Co., Ltd.

Banking

Guangshen Railway Company Limited

Railroad Transportation

China Railway Group Limited.

Civil Engineering Construction

Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Limited

Banking

Beijing North Star Company Limited

Estate Development and Operation

Aluminum Corporation Of China Limited

Nonferrous Metal Mining

China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co., Ltd.

Insurance

Shanghai Pharmaceuticals Holding Co.,Ltd.

Medicine Manufacturing

Metallurgical Corporation Of China Ltd.

Civil Engineering Construction

China Life Insurance Company Limited

Insurance

Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited

Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing

China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Co., Ltd.

Transportation Equipment Manufacturing

China Oilfield Services Limited

Oil and Gas Extraction

Petrochina Company Limited

Oil and Gas Extraction

China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited

Water Transportation

Dalian Port (Pda) Co., Ltd.

Port

China Coal Energy Company Limited

Coal Mining and Quarrying

Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd.

Nonferrous Metal Mining

China Cosco Holdings Company Limited

Water Transportation

China Construction Bank Corporation

Banking

Bank Of China Limited

Banking

Datang International Power Generation Co., Ltd.

Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and
Supply

China Citic Bank Corporation Limited

Banking

Table 3 provides summary statistics for the 68 firms in the sample. The average (median)
total asset is 1,102,470.00 (76,912.96) millions of Renminbi, while the average (median) total
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liabilities is 991,832.00 (41,644.26) millions of Renminbi. The average (median) total
shareholder’s equity is 110,634.00 (28,087.92) millions of Renminbi. The average (median) net
profit for the firms in the sample is 17,834.58 (2,446.03) millions of Renminbi. Also, the average
(median) total number of shares outstanding is 29,356.67 (6,771.08) millions of shares. In
addition, the average (median) market capitalization is 39,567.80 (14,316.90) millions of
Renminbi. The mean of tradable A-share is 15,681.03 millions of shares, almost twice of the
mean of tradable H-shares (8,745.80 millions of shares).
I use daily returns and trading volume to analyze the impact of information asymmetry on
the dynamic volume/return relationship. The use of daily data follows that of previous literature
(Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), Stickel and Verrecchia (1994), Llorente, Michaely,
Saar, and Wang (2002)). The return series I use for estimation is the daily return series for both
A- and H-shares of individual stocks from Yahoo Finance.
Following Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002), I use daily turnover as a measure
of trading volume for individual stocks. I define a stock’s daily turnover as the total number of
shares traded that day divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Since the daily time
series of turnover is non-stationary, the turnover is measured in logs in order to detrend the
resulting series. To avoid the problem of zero daily trading volume, small constant (0.00000255)
is added to the turnover before taking the logs. The value of the constant is chosen to make the
distribution of daily trading volume closer to a normal distribution.2 The resulting series is then
detrended by subtracting 200 trading day moving average:

2

Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986); Ajinkya and Jain (1989); and Cready and Ramanan (1991)
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Vt = log turnovert −

1 −1
∑ log turnovert + s
200 s =−200

where
log turnovert = log(turnovert + 0.00000255)

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics of the 68 sample firms dual-listed in the A- and H-share market during the period 20032011. Total assets are obtained from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Cashflows are obtained from operating cash flows,
generated from operating activities, and are measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the firm. Operating revenue is Sales
minus Cost of Goods Sold (and other expenses), before depreciation and amortization. Debt ratio is measured as the ratio of the
short-term and long-term debt to the total assets of the firm. Items are in millions of RMBs. Tradable A-share size is the number
of outstanding A-shares (in millions), while tradable H-share size is number of H-shares (in millions).
Variable
Total Asset

Maximum

Minimum

Mean

Median

Std Deviation

15476900

557.05

1102470

76912.96

3064500

180675

0

27504.46

9042.46

42053.88

2762156

56.68

181576.38

7918.48

571080.97

14519000

295.05

991832

41644.26

2879280

1082570

78.71

110634

28087.92

227508

15476900

557.05

1102470

76912.96

3064500

1015780

139.47

39567.8

14316.9

124812

Total Profit

272311

-6805.55

23079.94

3035.1

54257.25

Total Operating Revenue

271000

-7807.39

22730.63

2873.73

54100.76

Net Profit

208445

-8838.83

17834.58

2446.03

41922.51

3.36

-1.02

0.58

0.43

0.71

Net Cash Flow From Operating Activities

348123

-13480.35

33978.48

1872.31

77217.37

Total Number of Shares Outstanding

349083

398.92

29356.67

6771.08

72917.2

State Shares

268485

0

4421

0

32303.18

Tradable A Shares

262289

72.62

15681.03

3627.39

43233.64

Tradable H Shares

214837

100

8745.8

1431.03

29314.8

Long Term Debt
Cash And Cash Equivalents
Total Liabilities
Total Shareholders' Equity
Total Liabilities and Shareholder’s Equity
Market Capitalization

Basic Earnings per Share

Table 4 provides summary statistics that describe the return ad volume series used in the
estimation. The average return for A-shares is 0.03% vs. 0.09% for H-shares. The average size
for A-shares is 44,196,036,115 RMB vs. 43,108,948,156 RMB. The average turnover for A-
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shares is 0.0204658 vs. 0.0088371 for H-shares. This implies that the trading is more active in
the A-shares market than in H-share market. The variable of interest, volume, as defined
previously is -0.1433377 for A-shares vs. -0.0331528 for H-shares. This also captures the much
more active trading in the A-shares market. Next, I estimate the following relation for each
individual stock:

Returni,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Returnt + C2i*Volumei,t*Returnt + errori,t+1

where Volumei,t is the daily detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Returni,t+1 is the
daily return of an individual stock.
In principle, trading contains both hedging and speculative elements. The observed
volume-return relation depends on the relative importance of one type of trade to another.
Therefore, one should see a statistically significant positive C2 coefficient for stocks largely used
for speculative trade, while stocks used predominantly for hedging should produce a clearly
negative C2 coefficient. In addition, stocks for which neither speculative nor hedging trades
dominate should produce a C2 coefficient that is insignificantly different from zero. In other
words, the relation between C2 and the significance of a speculative trade, relative to a hedging
trade, is monotonic.
Next, I examine the relation between the importance of informed trading, which includes
both trading coming from better analysis and insider trading and firm size

C2t = a + b*ORDCapt + ERRORt,
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where ORDCap is a variable representing the ordinal scale of average firm size (market
capitalization). I expect the coefficient b to be positive (negative) if C2 captures more of trading
based on better analysis (insider trading).
Table 4. Summary Statistics

Variable

N

Mean

Median

StdDev

Minimum

Maximum

A Return

92254

0.0002698710

0.0000000000

0.0296557000

-0.5315488000

0.7361111000

H Return

92254

0.0008509780

0.0000000000

0.0403189000

-0.6666667000

2.0952381000

A Size

92254

44196036115

6666425864

152838011020

107020184

2063880000000

H Size

92254

43108948156

5714685525

127961935142

46497403

2056063000000

A Turnover

92254

0.0204658000

0.0118731000

0.0281283000

0.0000302930

1.4228630000

H Turnover

92254

0.0088371000

0.0057767000

0.0116996000

0.0000000000

0.4901600000

A Log(turnover)

92254

-4.5283590000

-4.4332658000

1.2457820000

-10.3236054000

0.3526728000

H Log(turnover)

92254

-5.4730336000

-5.1534757000

1.7921738000

-12.8774583000

-0.7130182000

A Volume

92254

-0.1433377000

-0.1692043000

0.8163219000

-5.1532660000

3.3824509000

H Volume

92254

-0.0331528000

0.0173589000

1.3874109000

-9.3021912000

11.7304722000

5. Empirical Results

In this section, I present the empirical results in testing the dynamic volume-return
relation, especially in how it relates to the underlying informed trading. I first report the results
on the C2 coefficient from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression from the return equation,
performed separately on A- and H-shares in order to analyze whether C2 captures more of
trading based on better analysis (insider trading). I then separate my sample into 2 periods and
examine the change in the C2 to further analyze the different components of informed trading whether it captures increased transparency in the financial market or greater liquidity and trading
from better analysis.
Table 5 presents the results from the above regression for individual stocks and how the
regression coefficients change with the market capitalization. For each stock in the sample, I
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estimate the parameters C0, C1, and C2 of the above equation. In panel A, I present summary
statistics for the time-series regressions for both A- and H- Share groups. The table shows that
the mean value of C2 is 0.0883250 for A-shares and 0.1342797 for H-shares. I further perform a
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank test to test whether the difference is statistically significant. The
result indicates that the difference for C2 is indeed statistically significant across A- and Hshares. This indicates that H-share market is more affected by informed trading. The
nonparametric analysis points in the same direction: seven out of 68 of the A-share stocks have
negative coefficients, compared to 0 out of 68 of the H-share stocks. Both parametric and
nonparametric results are consistent with the intuition that informed trading has a permanent
effect on prices (positive correlation between volume and price changes) whereas non-informed
trading tends to have temporary effect and results in price reversal (negative correlation).This
indicates both A-and H-shares are associated with informed trading. Both C2 coefficients of Aand H-shares are positive and statistically different from zero, indicating the importance of
speculative trading. More important is that the H-share market appears to be associated with a
greater degree of informed trading. Arguably the H-share market should have less insider trading
because the insider regulation for A-shares is looser and because the A-share market is the home
market -- one would expect more insiders in the home market. To the extent this argument is true
and that informed trading includes both insider trading and trading coming from better analysis,
the results here present indirect evidence that, relative to the A-share market, in the H-share
market substantially more informed trading can be attributed to trading based on better analysis.
This inference is not a trivial contribution because, to my knowledge, no study evaluates the
relative importance of insider trading and trading coming from better analysis.
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In Table 5 Panel B I regress informed trading of A- and H-shares on firm size. The
coefficient is -0.00035104 for A-shares and 0.00285 for H-shares. As mentioned earlier, I expect
the coefficient to be positive (negative) if C2 captures more of trading based on better analysis
(insider trading). The results represent indirect evidence that insider trading and firm size is
negatively related. For H-shares, as argued above, informed trading is more from better analysis,
and it is reasonable to argue larger firms have better analysis because large firms attract more
attention, can offer greater compensation for analysts, and have greater liquidity and an investor
base.
Next, I divide my sample period into two sub-periods. The first subsample covers the first
half of the sample period, which spans from January 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007. The second
subsample covers the second half of my sample periods from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2011.
Dividing the sample into two sub-periods allows me to examine the change in C2 in the two time
periods. The transparency in China mainland financial market might have improved over the last
decade. For example, China initiated a split-share reform in 2005. The reform allows investors
with non-tradable shares to be able to convert them into tradable shares. This should enhance
market liquidity and allows controlling shareholders to sell their shares at market prices. Before
the Split-share Structure Reform, two-thirds of the A-shares outstanding were non-tradable
shares owned mainly by the Chinese government and its affiliates and legal persons. The nontradable shares were transacted on contract base and subject to the approval of regulatory
authorities. The tradable shares were largely held by institutional and individual investors. The
purpose of establishing such dual share structure was to enable the state-owned enterprises (SOE)
to raise capital and the government to retain control. However, the structure fostered serious
speculations and agency problems. Therefore, the Split-share Structure Reform was carried out
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in an effort to help the Chinese market to function as a more efficient entity. If this is true and if
C2 decreases considerably, then C2 might capture more of insider trading since insider trading
should also have declined with increased transparency. On the contrary if C2 increases, then it
probably captures more of trading from better analysis, which is also another aspect of informed
trading. By dividing the sample into 2 subsamples, one can better understand the nature of C2.

Table 5. The Influence of Volume on the Autocorrelation of Stock Returns
in A- and H-Share Markets - Full Sample
This table shows the relation between information asymmetry and the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns.
The average daily market capitalization of a stock over the sample period (AvgCapi) is used as a proxy for information
asymmetry. For each stock the parameter C2i from the following regression measures the influence of volume on the
autocorrelation of stock returns: Returni,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Returnt + C2i*Volumei,t*Returnt + errori,t+1 where Volumei,t is the daily
detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Returni,t is the daily return of an individual stock. In Panel A, I report the mean
value of each parameter for both A-and H-shares of the information asymmetry proxy (AvgCap), the number of negative
parameters, and the number of statistically significant (at the 10% level) parameters. In panel B, I provide an analysis using the
following cross-sectional regression: C2t = a + b*ORDCAPt + ERRORt, where ORDCAP is a variable representing the ordinal
scale of AvgCap. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Panel A. Categorical Analysis

A Share

n=68

H Share

n=68

Wilcoxon Z

C0

C1

C2

t-stat(C0)

t-stat(C1)

t-stat(C2)

R-Square

#<0

#<0

#<0

|#|>1.64

|#|>1.64

|#|>1.64

(%)

-0.0003853

0.0132361

0.0883250

(0.0008041)

(0.0631140)

(0.1081990)

-0.4635294

0.6816667

2.4434286

46

22

7

8

23

54

0.3222059

-0.4166176

3.1685294

8

28

57

0.0004036

-0.0066256

0.1342797

(0.0013601)

(0.0390351)

(0.0591813)

26

39

0

3.6173***

-3.2191***

1.8122**

21

5.55

5.70

Panel B. Regression Analysis

A Share

H Share

Dependent Variable

a

b

R-Square (%)

Observations

C2

0.10079***

-0.00035104***

1.4

68

(0.04606)

(0.00113)

0.0343

0.00285***

4.87

68

(0.06243)

(0.00153)

C2

Table 6 presents the results from the first half of the sample period. For the first
subsample there are 43 cross-listed A/H stocks. For each stock in the sample I estimate the
parameters C0, C1, and C2 similar to the regression used in Table 5. In Table 6 Panel A, I
present summary statistics for the time series regression for both A- and H-share groups. The
table shows that the mean value of C2 is 0.0868305 for A-shares and 0.0709947 for H-shares.
The nonparametric analysis points in the same direction: 9 out of 43 of the A-share stocks have
negative coefficients, compared to only 5 out of 43 of the H-share stocks. This indicates both Aand H-Shares are associated with information asymmetry. However, only C2 coefficients of Hshares are positive and statistically different from zero, indicating the importance of speculative
trading. In Table 6 Panel B the firm size coefficient is -0.003466173 for A-share and
0.001823691 for H-Share. This result also suggests that A-shares have more informed trading
that comes from insider trading, while H-shares have more informed trading based on better
analysis.

22

Table 6. The Influence of Volume on the Autocorrelation of Stock Returns
in A- and H-Share Markets (January 2003 – June 2007)
This table shows the relation between information asymmetry and the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns.
The average daily market capitalization of a stock over the sample period (AvgCapi) is used as a proxy for information
asymmetry. For each stock the parameter C2i from the following regression measures the influence of volume on the
autocorrelation of stock returns: Returni,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Returnt + C2i*Volumei,t*Returnt + errori,t+1where Volumei,t is the daily
detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Returni,t is the daily return of an individual stock. In Panel A, I report the mean
value of each parameter for both A-and H-shares of the information asymmetry proxy (AvgCap), the number of negative
parameters and the number of statistically significant (at the 10% level) parameters. In panel B, I provide an analysis using the
following cross-sectional regression: C2t = a + b*ORDCAPt + ERRORt, where ORDCAP is a variable representing the ordinal
scale of AvgCap. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Panel A. Categorical Analysis

A Share

C0

C1

C2

t-stat(C0)

t-stat(C1)

t-stat(C2)

R-Square

#<0

#<0

#<0

|#|>1.64

|#|>1.64

|#|>1.64

(%)

0.9660000

-0.3822222

1.4937209

3.80

0.0017431

-0.0525420

0.0868305

(0.0018854)

(0.0720453)

(0.1280795)

n=43

7

25

9

13

11

24

H Share

0.0021729

-0.0331833

0.0709947

1.5453488

-0.5962791

2.1639535

(0.001606)

(0.0678428)

(0.0963158)

2

28

5

21

11

28

-0.2381

-0.1396

n=43
Wilcoxon Z

2.5481**

7.80

Panel B. Regression Analysis

A Share

H Share

Dependent Variable

a

b

R-Square (%)

Observations

C2

0.163086279

-0.003466173*

2.86

43

(0.079758205)

(0.003157658)

0.030873455

0.001823691*

1.31

43

(0.062515493)

(0.002475012)

C2

Next, I analyze the second half of my sample period to see if there are changes in C2
coefficients. Table 7 presents the results from the second half of my sample period. For the
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second subsample there are 68 cross-listed A/H stocks. For each stock in the sample I estimate
the parameters C0, C1, and C2 similar to the regression used in Table 5 and Table 6. In Table 7
Panel A, I present summary statistics for the time series regression for both A- and H-share
groups. The table shows that the mean value of C2 is 0.0987509 for A-shares and 0.1428814 for
H-shares. The nonparametric analysis points in the same direction: 4 out of 68 of the A-share
stocks have negative coefficients, compared to 0 out of 68 of the H-share stocks. The nonparametric results shows that for both A-and H-Shares market, the numbers of firms have
negative coefficients are smaller than the first half of my subsample. Both C2 coefficients of Aand H-shares are positive and statistically different from zero. In Table 7 Panel B I again use Aand H-share as proxies for information asymmetry and the coefficient is -0.001283962 for Ashare and 0.002976575 for H-Share. This result is again consistent with my expectation that the
coefficient b to be positive (negative) if C2 captures more of trading based on better analysis
(insider trading). This implies that A-shares have more informed trading that comes from insider
trading while H-shares have more of informed trading based on better analysis.
From the above analysis the C2 coefficients for both A- and H-shares increases in the
second half of my sample period. As argued earlier, an increase in C2 suggests that C2 captures
more of trading based on better analysis. The result here is consistent with this argument because
the analysis and valuation of these firms should have improved over time. Stated differently, the
result is inconsistent with C2 capturing more than insider trading because insider trading should
not have increased with the increased transparency in the Chinese firms. The different degrees of
C2 increase between the A- and H- markets are also noteworthy. In particular, for H-shares, C2
increased from 0.0709947 to 0.142881. The coefficient for the second half of the subsample
almost doubles the coefficient in the first half for the H-shares. However, for the A share market,
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the increase in C2 is much lower. The much less pronounced change in A-share’s C2 is
consistent with the earlier conclusion that C2 captures more of insider trading in the A-share
market. As argued above, informed trading derives more from better analysis and also from large
firms since large firms tend to attract more attention, have greater compensation for analysts, and
have greater liquidity and investor base.
Table 7.The Influence of Volume on the Autocorrelation of Stock Returns
in A- and H- Share Markets-(July 2007 – December 2011)
This table shows the relation between information asymmetry and the influence of volume on the autocorrelation of stock returns.
The average daily market capitalization of a stock over the sample period (AvgCapi) is used as a proxy for information
asymmetry. For each stock the parameter C2i from the following regression measures the influence of volume on the
autocorrelation of stock returns: Returni,t+1 = C0i + C1i*Returnt + C2i*Volumei,t*Returnt + errori,t+1where Volumei,tis the daily
detrended log turnover of an individual stock and Returni,t is the daily return of an individual stock. In Panel A, I report the mean
value of each parameter for both A-and H-shares of the information asymmetry proxy (AvgCap), the number of negative
parameters and the number of statistically significant (at the 10% level) parameters. In panel B, I provide an analysis using the
following cross-sectional regression: C2t = a + b*ORDCAPt + ERRORt, where ORDCAP is a variable representing the ordinal
scale of AvgCap. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Panel A. Categorical Analysis
C0

C1

C2

t-stat(C0)

t-stat(C1)

t-stat(C2)

R-Square

#<0

#<0

#<0

|#|>1.64

|#|>1.64

|#|>1.64

(%)

-0.0007802

0.0251611

0.0987509

-0.8262319

1.0491304

2.3272464

7.20

(0.0011523)

(0.0672457)

(0.1146480)

n=68

62

15

4

7

26

46

H Share

-2.198E-05

-0.0088177

0.1428814

-0.1917391

-0.384058

2.7547826

(0.0015384)

(0.0435726)

(0.0645906)

40

43

0

4

21

53

A Share

n=68
Wilcoxon Z

-4.1071***

4.5635***

1.9769**

25

5.60

Panel B. Regression Analysis

A Share

H Share

Dependent Variable

a

b

R-Square (%)

Observations

C2

0.14368954

-0.001283962*

1.8

68

(0.046592368)

(0.001157002)

0.038701309

0.002976575**

5.17

68

(0.062720092)

(0.001557492)

C2

As an additional test to confirm the above findings, I employ the variance ratio test in
French and Roll (1986). Specifically, they analyze the ratio of the variance during trading period
(weekday) to the variance of trading during non-trading period (weekend). If uninformed trading
or noise represents a considerable part of trading, the weekday variance should be greater than
that of weekend, adjusted for the number of days. In Table 8, I measure weekday and weekend
volatility for both A- and H-stocks. Weekend variance is measured over 2+ days while weekday
is daily. Volatility should increase proportionally with time, assuming other factors held constant.
As the table shows, weekend variance measured over 2+ days is far less than 2+ times of
weekday variance, suggesting a strong presence of noise trading. The average return weekday
volatility for H-share is 0.0014922 and 0.000833701 for A-shares, almost double that of A-share
return volatility, which further indicates that there is more informed trading in H-share markets
that come from better analysis. The variance ratios for the A-shares and H-shares are 0.8774 and
0.8138 respectively. The greater the ratio, the greater the noise implied. The result indicates that
H-share has less noise. This is consistent with the earlier conclusion that the H-share market has
relatively more trading coming from informed analysis.
Given the assumptions that A-share has more insiders trading and that it has not increased
over time, the results suggests that the H-share market has relatively more informed trading
based on better analysis. With the assumption lower insider trading and the previous results of
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the C2 coefficients, the fact that H-shares have higher C2 coefficients suggests that there is
relative more trading motivated by better analysis in H-shares market. I interpret the results as
indirect evidence that larger firms tend to have trading with better analysis and less insider
trading.
The sub-period results further confirm that H-shares have relatively more informed
trading based on better analysis because insider trading should not have increased, and therefore
the substantial C2 increase is further evidence that trading based on better analysis dominates in
H-shares. This makes sense because Hong Kong shares market has a long experience n analyzing
stocks. But initially, investors in Hong Kong might have difficulty evaluating Chinese firms with
low degree of transparency and political factors. The relatively small C2 increase in A-shares is
also indirect evidence that stock valuation has not substantially improved over time in A-shares.
That is, it has implication on the changes in the Chinese investment environment. The results
here also suggest the methodology developed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002), for
established stocks, captures more of trading based on better analysis.
One related question arising for these cross-listed securities is whether informed trading
in both the A- and H-shares market impacts the relative pricing of A-and H-shares. If H-shares
have higher C2 coefficients, suggesting that there is relative more trading motivated by better
analysis in H-shares market, these better analyses will bring the stock price more close to its
intrinsic value. On the other hand, given the fact that the A-shares market tends to have excess
speculative trading or insiders trading, the A-share price may deviate more from its intrinsic
value. Given the assumption that the Hong Kong market has better transparency than the Chinese
mainland stock market, the H-share price is more close to the stock’s intrinsic value. Therefore, I
expect that informed trading coefficients for H-shares to be negatively correlated with the
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average H-share discount, while informed coefficients for A-shares to be positively correlated
with the H-share discount. To carry out this analysis, I first compute the discounts or premiums
for H-shares as follow:

Discount_Hi,t =

RMB
PH
i,t ×
HKD
PAi,t

-1

where Discounti, t is the discount (premium) for H-shares i if it is negative (positive). PH
i,t is the
H-share price from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, HKDRMB is the exchange rate for Hong
Kong dollars to one Renminbi, and PAi,t is the underlying A-share price from the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. I then average the discount over the entire sample period.

Table 8. Average Ratios of Weekdays and Weekends Variances for A- and H-Shares

Return

N

Mean

StdDev

Variance

Weekdays

56158

-0.000216525

0.0288739

0.000833701

Weekends

36026

0.0010229

0.0308252

0.00095019

56158

0.000202364

0.0386291

0.0014922

Weekday /weekend variance Ratio

A Share
0.8774

H Share
Weekdays

0.8138
Weekends

36026

0.0018462

0.0428209

0.0018336
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∆ Return

N

Mean

StdDev

Variance

56157

0.0000001375

0.0409646000

0.0016781000

Weekday /weekend variance Ratio

A Share
Weekdays

0.9649
Weekends

36025

0.0000009546

0.0417038000

0.0017392000

Weekdays

56157

-0.0000010279

0.0557001000

0.0031025000

Weekends

36025

0.0000000521

0.0597648000

0.0035718000

H Share

0.8686

Next, I perform correlation and regression analysis to see how C2 coefficients for both Aand H-shares are related with the average H-share discount. The negative coefficients indicate
that the variables in question have the effect of making the H-share discount bigger, i.e., more
negative. Table 9 Panel A shows that C2 coefficients for A-share are positively correlated with
the probability of discount, while that C2 coefficient for H-share is negatively correlated with the
probability of discount. Although both C2 coefficients are correlated with the average discount,
the correlation is insignificant. This positive/negative correlation is also confirmed in the
regression analysis. In the regression analysis, I use the average discount as dependent viable
while that C2 coefficient for A- and H-shares as independent variable:

Average H

    C2 coef icients %A&  C2 coef icients %H&  Error

Table 9 Panel B provides the regression results, and both coefficients are insignificant.
Therefore, there is no conclusive evidence regarding the relation between informed trading and
the relative pricing of A- and H-shares.
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Table 9. H-Share Discount and Informed Trading

Panel A. Correlation Matrix for the Average Discount and Informed Trading
Average discount

C2 (A-shares)

1.00000

0.09372

C2(H-shares)

-0.13133
Average discount

C2 (A-shares)

1.00000

C2(H-shares)

0.02909
1.00000

Panel B. Regression Analysis for the Average Discount and Informed Trading

Average discount

Parameter Estimate

Standard Error

t statistics

Intercept

-0.171975239

0.051303309

-3.35

C2 (A-shares)

0.181877289

0.224649176

0.81

C2 (H-shares)

-0.17999801

0.161764707

-1.11

R-Square (%)

2.68

6. Conclusion

In this study, I adopt the methodology developed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang
(2002) to study a sample of Chinese firms dual-listed in both the China mainland stock exchange
and the Hong Kong stock exchange. In particular, I investigate the two types of informed
trading--insiders trading and better analysis in A-and H-shares market. With the unique two30

market system one can better understand the nature of C2. That is, in addition to understanding
the extent of informed trading in China, this unique setting helps one to understand the nature of
C2. Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) do not distinguish the two different aspect of
informed trading – insider trading and trading comes from better analysis. However, the analysis
in this paper provides new evidence on these two aspects of informed trading.
My results suggest that H-shares have relatively more informed trading based on better
analysis. With an assumption of lower insider trading and the result that H-shares have higher C2
coefficients suggests that there is relative more trading motivated by better analysis in the Hshares market. Together with the firm size regression, the results can be interpreted as indirect
evidence that larger firms tend to have trading with better analysis and less insider trading.
By dividing the sample into two sub-samples, I examine the changes in C2 in the two
subsequent sample periods. The C2 coefficient for the second half of the subsample almost
doubles the coefficient in the first half for the H-shares. The sub-period results further confirm
that H-shares has relatively more informed trading based on better analysis because insider
trading should not have increased, and therefore the substantial C2 increase is further evidence
trading based on better analysis dominates in the H-shares market. This makes sense because the
Hong Kong shares market has a long experience in analyzing stocks. The relatively small C2
increase in A-shares is also indirect evidence that stock valuation has not substantially improved
over time in A-shares. That is, it has implication on the changes in the Chinese investment
environment. Lastly, I also examine whether there is a relationship between informed trading and
the relative pricing of A- and H-shares, but find no significant relation.
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Correlation of Currency Futures Prices and Liquidity
1. Introduction

A currency future is a standardized contract used to exchange, at some future date, one
type of currency for another at a fixed exchange rate. Investors typically use currency future
contracts for two distinct purposes: to hedge against foreign exchange risk and speculation and
arbitrage. In regards to hedging, if an investor were to receive a cashflow denominated in a
foreign currency, than that investor can lock in the current exchange rate by entering into an
offsetting currency futures position that expires on the date of the cashflow. However, by
incurring some amount of risk, investors can also speculate on currency futures and profit from
the rising or falling of exchange rates.
As of late 2009 the IMM (International Monetary Market), a division of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, estimated that the average daily notional value for the currency futures
market was approximately $100 billion. Given the importance of currency futures this study
investigates the dynamic correlation across currency futures prices to U.S. dollar index futures3,
with the focus on the persistency of correlation between eight currency futures prices traded on
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange: Australian dollar, British pound, Brazilian real, Canadian
dollar, Euro currency, Japanese yen, Russian ruble, and Swiss franc. Using the Dynamic
Conditional Correlation (DCC) model developed by Engle (2002), I incorporate time-varying
correlations into the analysis. This study differentiates from previous studies in that it is the first
to analyze the persistency of relation between currencies future prices. Lyons (2002) shows
3

U.S. dollar index futures are listed on the Financial Instruments Exchange (FINEX).
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currency movement is heavily influenced by trading. Based on this study, liquidity also should
be an important factor affecting dynamic correlation--that is, this study motivates the study of the
relation between liquidity and dynamic correlation of currencies future prices. In regards to
liquidity, there are numerous studies examining liquidity in the spots market; however, there is
only a handful studies in regards to the futures market. Moreover, there is no previous study on
how different aspects of liquidity impact the conditional correlation of currency futures. In this
study, I analyze both price and trading aspects of liquidity of currency futures and how changing
liquidity potentially affects time-varying conditional correlation. The data concerning liquidity is
available daily, hence allowing for a more detailed analysis.
The sample spans from1999 to 2008. The study finds that the persistency of currency
futures interactions varies substantially across different currencies. The Canadian dollar has the
greater persistency while the Brazilian real has the weakest. Further, the time-varying conditional
correlation between other currency futures and U.S. dollar futures are influenced by liquidity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is the literature review, Section 3
presents data, Section 4 describes the methodology used in the paper, Section 5 presents the
empirical results, and Section 6 gives the conclusion.
2. Literature Review

This paper is most related to Lien and Yang (2006), who investigates the effects of spotfutures spread on the risk and return structure in currency markets. With the use of a bivariate
GARCH framework, evidence is found that spreads on the risk and return structure of spot and
futures markets produce asymmetric effects. The implications of these asymmetric effects are
examined, with special consideration given to the performance of futures hedging strategies. A
specific strategy, generated from a model incorporating asymmetric effects, is compared to
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several alternative models. The in-sample comparison results indicate that the asymmetric effect
model provides the best hedging strategy for all currency markets examined, except for the
Canadian dollar. Out-of-sample comparisons suggest that the asymmetric effect model provides
the best strategy for the Australian dollar, the British pound, the Deutsche mark, and the Swiss
franc markets, and that the symmetric effect model provides a better strategy (than the
asymmetric effect model) for the Canadian dollar and Japanese yen. However, this study
differentiates from Lien and Yang (2006) in that the DCC model is used instead of the bivariate
GARCH. The DCC model is similar to a bivariate GARCH in spirit, but the DCC places some
restrictions on how the correlation can change (in essence it is a special case of a bivariate
GARCH).
There are also several important studies examining volatility and futures. Harvey and
Huang (1991) examine the volatility implications of around-the-clock foreign exchange trading
with transaction data on futures contracts from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the
London International Financial Futures Exchange; whereas, Han, Kling and Sell (1999) use
standard deviations and numbers of price changes calculated from tick data for currency futures.
In Harvey and Huang’s study the authors find higher U.S.-European and U.S.-Japanese
exchange-rate volatilities during U.S. trading hours and higher European cross-rate volatilities
during European trading hours. While the disclosure of private information through trading may
partly explain these volatility patterns, they conclude that the increased volatility is more likely
driven by macroeconomic news announcements. An analysis of inter- and intraday data also
reveals that volatility increases at times that coincide with the release of U.S. macroeconomic
news. In contrast, Han, Kling and Sell (1999) find strong day-of-the-week effects for the
Deutsche mark and Japanese yen, mild day-of-the-week effects for the British pound, and no

38

effects for the Canadian dollar after controlling for scheduled macroeconomic announcements
and days to contract expiration. The day-of-the-week effects are found to be caused either by
Mondays’ low volatility, or by Thursdays’ or Fridays’ high volatility. This result suggests that
the day-of-the-week effects in the currency futures market is not driven by the announcements of
macroeconomic indicators as proposed in previous studies, but rather by other factors, such as
private information-based trading or by market microstructure. The study also finds that the
announcements are processed equally across the days of the week for all four currency futures.
In addition, Kho (1996) and Fung and Patterson also examine currencies from a volatility
perspective. Kho (1996) re-examines the efficiency of foreign currency futures markets by
evaluating the role of time-varying risk premia and volatility in explaining technical trading rule
profits. The results show that large parts of the technical rule profits can be explained by timevarying risk premia estimated from a general model for the conditional CAPM. The bootstrap
distributions for the profits under the null model average one-third to one-half of the actual
profits and enclose the actual profits well within the 90% confidence intervals. Time-varying
conditional volatility explains an additional 10% of the profits. In contrast, Fung and Patterson
(1999) examine the dynamic interactions among return volatilities, volume, and market depth for
five currency futures markets. They use vector autoregressive analysis (VAR) to identify not
only the nature of these relations but also the direction and speed of the information flow
between variables. They find that return volatility is subject to strong reversal effects from
trading volume and market depth. The results also indicate that the volatility appears to have
predictive power on volume, but not market depth. Furthermore, this study finds that volume and
depth are not endogenously determined, as their lead–lag relationship is asymmetrical. In
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addition, they observe an increasing trend of integration between offshore and domestic
information that affects the movement of currency futures prices.
More recent studies include Levich (2012), Röthig (2004), and Lien and Yang (2006).
Levich (2012) studies both counterparty risk for financial institutions and currency futures. He
finds that for the period 2005-2011 the market share for currency futures trading actually grew
relative to the pre-crisis period of the 2007 Financial Crisis. He hypothesizes that this shift could
be the result of one of several factors; namely, perceived increase in counterparty risk among
banks, changes in relative trading costs, or changes in institutional factors. The framework
Levich utilizes, which is mostly graphical analysis, is very different from Lien and Yang (2006)
and Röthig (2004), who both utilize GARCH-type models.
Röthig (2004) examines the impact of currency futures trading on underlying exchange
rates. Using a VAR-GARCH approach he examines the relationship between currency futures
trading activity (as measured by number of contracts) and total amount of spot market turbulence
for the exchange rates from 5 countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland) in
terms of U.S. dollar. The author finds that there is a positive relationship between currency
futures trading activity and spot volatility and, moreover, that futures trading activity adds
significantly to spot volatility.
McCurdy and Morgan wrote several papers together concerning currency futures:

McCurdy and Morgan (1987) and McCurdy and Morgan (1992). In their 1987 paper the authors
test the martingale hypothesis for daily and weekly rates of change of futures prices for five
currencies. Using daily data, they find some evidence against the null hypothesis for each
currency. Although institutionally imposed limits on daily price changes were found to be
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frequently binding (often in the earlier years of the sample), the results are not substantially
different when data affected by limit moves are removed. Trading day effects in foreign currency
futures and spot prices introduce complicated day-of-the-week patterns in futures price. The
study concludes with the retesting of the martingale hypothesis using weekly data. They reject
the null hypothesis for only one currency. One interpretation regarding the evidence for this
rejected currency is that a time-varying risk premium exists. This was followed by McCurdy
and Morgan (1992), in which weekly data for foreign currency futures prices is examined for
evidence of a risk premium. Covariance risks are measured with respect to the excess returns of
benchmark portfolios for consumption and wealth. When the parameters representing the prices
of the covariance risks are held constant, no risk premiums are detected. However, when these
prices are allowed to vary with the conditional expected returns and the variances of the
benchmark portfolios, possibly reflecting changing investment opportunities, strong evidence of
risk premiums is obtained.
In the mid to late 1990s several studies examined currency futures from either option-like
or statistical perspectives. In Bates (1996), Deutsche mark and yen futures options are examined
for deviations from the lognormal assumption underlying standard option pricing models. Two
methods are used: a theoretical skewness premium and daily estimates of moments using a
model developed for pricing American foreign currency futures options under systematic
exchange rate jump risk. Substantial variation over time is found in all moments, along with
implicit skewness and kurtosis. These implicit abnormalities help predict future abnormalities for
log-differenced U.S. dollar-Deutsche mark futures prices, but not U.S. dollar-Japanese Yen
futures prices. Pan, Chan and Fok (1997), on the other hand, examines the random walk process
for four currency futures prices for the period 1977–1987 by using a variance ratio test. The
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random walk hypothesis is tested through asymptotic standardized statistics as well as by
computing the significance level, based on a bootstrap method. Both long time-series prices and
individual contract prices for four currency futures (i.e. the British pound, the German mark, the
Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc) are analyzed. The results provide little evidence against the
random walk null hypothesis, though non-randomness is documented in the Japanese yen.
Additionally, the currency futures markets apparently become more efficient as markets mature
over time.
Bhar and Malliaris (1998) propose and test several hypotheses concerning time series
properties of trading volume, price, short and long-term relationships between price and volume,
and the determinants of trading volume in foreign currency futures. Contracts for the British
pound, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, German mark, and Swiss franc are analyzed in three
frequencies: daily, weekly and monthly. They find supportive evidence for all five currencies
that the price volatility is a determinant of the trading volume changes. Furthermore, the
volatility of the price process is a determinant of the unexpected component of the changes in
trading volume. They also find that there is a significant relationship between the volatility of
price and the volatility of trading volume changes for three of the five currencies in the daily
frequency and for one currency in the monthly frequency.
As for liquidity, it has been widely studied with stock markets. Amihud (2002) shows
that over time, expected market illiquidity positively affects ex-ante stock excess return,
suggesting that expected stock excess return partly represents an illiquidity premium. This
complements the cross-sectional positive return–illiquidity relationship. In addition, stock returns
are negatively related over time to contemporaneous unexpected illiquidity. The illiquidity
measure here is the average across stocks of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar
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volume, which is easily obtained from daily stock data for long time series in most stock markets.
Illiquidity affects more strongly small firm stocks, thus explaining time series variations in their
premiums over time. Further, liquidity is also studied in dual-listed markets. Chan et al (2008)
study the liquidity effect in asset pricing by studying the liquidity- premium relationship of an
American Depositary Receipt (ADR) and its underlying share. Using the Amihud (2002)
measure, the turnover ratio and trading infrequency as proxies for liquidity, they show that a
higher ADR premium is associated with higher ADR liquidity and lower home share liquidity, in
terms of changes in these variables. They find that the liquidity effects remain strong and they
control for firm size and a number of country characteristics, such as the expected change in the
foreign exchange rate, the stock market performance, as well as several variables measuring the
openness and transparency of the home market. Goss (2006) studies liquidity, volume and
volatility in U.S. electricity futures. However, liquidity in futures is expected to behave
differently to that of spot markets because of the unique asymmetries in futures markets.
Liquidity in electricity markets is of interest in countries where markets are being deregulated.
This study estimates these relationships for the Palo Verde electricity futures contract. The
results show positive relations between all three pairs of key variables.
3. Data

The initial futures data consists of daily future prices for currency futures over the period
January 1999 to June 2008. This data is collected from RC Research (www.Price-Data.com) and
includes open, high, low, and close prices; as well as, volume and open interest. All daily future
prices are in U.S. dollars. The currency futures included in this study are listed as follows:
Australian dollar, British pound, Brazilian real, Canadian dollar, Euro currency, Japanese yen,
Russian ruble, and Swiss franc. All eight currency futures are traded on the Chicago Mercantile
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Exchange (CME) and all currencies prices are coded the same way—the US$ price of per unit of
currency. Table 1 provides a summary of the contract size, approximate margin, and minimal
fluctuation of the 8 currency futures. The weighted U.S. dollar futures are used as a basis for
comparison. The U.S. dollar index (USDX)4 is an index (or measure) of the value of the United
States dollar relative to a basket of foreign currencies. The USDX futures contract has two

features that influence its pricing and its use. First, the USDX index is a geometric average,
rather than an arithmetic average,5 of the constituent currencies. Second, the foreign exchange
(FX) rates in the USDX index (in U.S. dollars per foreign exchange rate) are in the denominator
of the index, implying that a dollar appreciation leads to a higher index level. Both the geometric
averaging and the use of quoting convention have implication for the use of the USDX futures
contract in hedging a foreign exchange exposure. Eytan, Harpaz, and Krull (1988) point out, the
divergence between the geometric and arithmetic averages depend on both the volatilities of the
individual currencies and their co-movements (sometimes referred to as their “correlations”).
Table 1. Sample Periods for Currency Futures Traded in U.S.
Symbol

Futures Contract

Sample Period

Contract Size

Approximate Margin

Minimum Fluctuation

Observation

AD

Australian Dollar

BP

British Pound

01/13/1987-06/02/2008

A$100,000

02/13/1975-06/02/2008

62,500 pound

$1,688.00

0.01 c/A$ = $10

5378

$1,890.00

0.01 c/pound = $6.25

8384

BR

Brazilian Real

11/08/1995-06/02/2008

BR100,000

$3,500.00

0.005 c/BR = $5

3122

CD

Canadian Dollar

1/17/1977-06/02/2008

C$100,000

$1,215.00

0.01 c/C$ = $10

7898

EC

Euro Currency

JY

Japanese Yen

01/04/1999-06/02/2008

EUR $125,000

$2,700.00

0.01 c/EUR = $12.50

2355

08/02/1976-06/02/2008

Yen 12,500,000

$2,430.00

0.0001 c/JY = $12.50

8014

RU

Russian Ruble

2/4/1993-06/02/2008

MRR 2,500,000

$3,000.00

0.001 c/RR = $25

3858

SF

Swiss Franc

02/13/1975-06/02/2008

SF 125,000

$1,958.00

0.01 c/SF = $12.50

8383

4

The short-coming of using the U.S. Currency Futures Index is that it is an unequally weighted index - so, the
currency that is weighted more heavily, such as Euro, will inherently move more closely with the index.
5
This difference between arithmetic and geometric averaging is the source of the divergence between the index (and
therefore futures contract) performance and the portfolio performance. (The portfolio is constructed as an investor is
long $1 million in the six constituent currencies of the USDX index, in the proper weights (57.6% in euro, 13.5% in
yen, etc.).The larger the divergence of performance of the different currencies, the larger the divergence between the
geometric average and the arithmetic average.
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The USDX futures contract began trading on November 20, 1985 on the Financial
Instruments Exchange, a division of the New York Cotton Exchange, which is now part of the
New York Board of Trade (NYBOT). The USDX index was originally a geometrically weighted
average of ten different currencies, with each currency representing a country that was a major
trading partner with the United States. With the introduction of the Euro, the USDX index
became a geometrically weighted average of six currencies, which represent five major U.S.
trading partners and the Euro. Appendix 2 describes the current contract specifications for the
USDX futures contract.

Index Formula

The formula for the index level on date t is the product of the six currencies spot rates,
each raised a power related to a currency-specific weight. The general formula for the index can
be written as

4

() *+  , -.*/,+ 

123

/56

where USDXt is the calculated level of the USDX index on date t, FXi,t is the foreign exchange
rate (U.S. dollars per foreign currency unit) for currency i on date t, wi is the weight associated
with currency i (the weights are determined by the contract specs and sum to one, i.e.,∑4
/56 8/ 
1). N is the number of currencies in the index for the USDX index, (N is currently six and was
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formerly ten); and K is a constant. Under the current USDX futures contract specs, the USDX
index is equal to

() *+  50.14348112 @ %A+ &1B.CDE @ %F+ &1B.6GE @ %)HI+ &1B.66J
@ %KLLML HHL+ &1B.BJ6 @ %)8MN,+ &1B.BOP
@ %)8.L+ &1B.BGE

In other words, it is a weighted geometric mean of the following:
Euro (EUR), 57.6% weight
Japanese yen (JPY) 13.6% weight
Pound sterling (GBP), 11.9% weight
Canadian dollar (CAD), 9.1% weight
Swedish krona (SEK), 4.2% weight and
Swiss franc (CHF) 3.6% weight

I first begin by checking for stationarity of the price series data and find that the price
series are non-stationary (the null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected), while their first
differences are stationary. This implies that the use of a return series is appropriate, with the
return being computed as the log of the current price over the previous price. Table 2 provides
the summary statistics of the daily currency futures returns. The distribution of the daily futures
returns is not normal, according to the Jarque-Bera test, and characterized by high kurtosis;
especially, for the Brazilian real and Russian ruble. In addition, the Australian dollar, British
pound, Brazilian real, Canadian dollar, and Euro currency futures returns are all negatively
skewed. In contrast, the Japanese yen, Russian ruble, and Swiss franc are all positively skewed.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics on Daily Currency Futures Returns
Australian Dollar
Mean

British Pound

Brazilian Real

Canadian Dollar

Euro Currency

Japanese Yen

Russian Ruble

Swiss Franc

3.18E-05

-8.46E-06

-7.34E-05

1.13E-06

4.97E-05

5.62E-05

9.07E-05

4.43E-05

Median

0.000157581

0

0

0

6.87E-05

0

0.000430829

0

Maximum

0.022452484

0.019772928

0.277946112

0.009300023

0.011453081

0.035933091

0.154327806

0.021572106

Minimum

-0.019667895

-0.022873448

-0.320463148

-0.011405534

-0.011562519

-0.018272159

-0.155461735

-0.033270935

Variance

8.80676E-06

9.22146E-06

0.000323549

2.47396E-06

7.10789E-06

9.74863E-06

0.000455771

1.14048E-05

Std. Dev.

0.002967618

0.003036686

0.017987459

0.001572883

0.002666062

0.00312228

0.021348784

0.003377095

Skewness

-0.383453315

-0.077403656

-1.328845259

-0.098795122

-0.030307375

0.564362196

0.015603163

0.093215516

Kurtosis

5.886010598

7.149241707

172.7144473

6.350768181

3.829401019

8.376932798

34.1886891

5.910303671

Jarque-Bera

1997.825011

6021.848429

3746507.82

3707.210228

67.83249116

10078.1588

156326.6691

2970.239927

Probability

0

0

0

0

1.89E-15

0

0

0

Regarding liquidity, I measure liquidity in terms of the price impact of trading and trading activity/ trading volume. For this
paper I adopt two liquidity measures, since previous literature suggests that liquidity cannot be measured by one metric alone (Sadka
et al (2008)). The price impact of trading is computed using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, which is the absolute percentage
price change divided by trading volume. This impact is computed daily and averaged over the sample period. The larger the number
the greater is the impact of trading on prices, indicating a more illiquid currency future. Amihud illiquidity measures the price impact
aspect of liquidity and quantifies the price/return response to a given size of trade. Liquidity, also has another aspect – trading. To
address this aspect, I use the logarithm of trading volume as an alternative liquidity measure and perform a similar analysis. Table 3
shows the Amihud illiquidity measure, trading volume, and logarithm of trading volume for the eight currency futures included in this
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study. From this table one can see that the Brazilian real is the most illiquid currency future
contracts among the eight; also, that the Russian ruble6 is much less liquid than other currency
futures. Not surprisingly, the euro currency has the lowest number for the Amihud illiquidity
measure. Most likely this is due to the fact that the euro is considered to be the most popularly
traded currency futures contract. The Japanese yen also has a very low Amihud illiquidity
measure number. This also makes sense since the Japanese yen is frequently used as a carry trade
currency, due to the country’s near zero interest rates. Finally, the trading volume data also tells
the same story of the eight currency futures. That is, the Brazilian real is the least traded currency
futures and the Euro currency and Japanese yen are the most common and popularly traded
futures.

Table 3. Summary Statistics of Liquidity Measures
Liquidity Measures

Mean

Median

StdDev

Minimum

Maximum

Amihud Illiquidity Australian Dollar

0.000011

0.000002

0.000144

0.000000

0.005876

Amihud Illiquidity British Pound

0.000004

0.000001

0.000063

0.000000

0.002723

Amihud Illiquidity Brazilian Real

0.001849

0.000057

0.022539

0.000000

0.657169

Amihud Illiquidity Canadian Dollar

0.000003

0.000000

0.000031

0.000000

0.001110

Amihud Illiquidity Euro Currency

0.000002

0.000000

0.000024

0.000000

0.000998

Amihud Illiquidity Japanese Yen

0.000002

0.000000

0.000023

0.000000

0.000706

Amihud Illiquidity Russian Ruble

0.000005

0.000003

0.000008

0.000000

0.000131

Amihud Illiquidity Swiss Franc

0.000005

0.000001

0.000046

0.000000

0.001120

Volume Australian Dollar

3704.010000

2365.000000

4751.650000

0.000000

90210.000000

Volume British Pound

6289.750000

4316.000000

7280.260000

3.000000

116014.000000

Volume Brazilian Real

905.167022

1.000000

13039.380000

0.000000

343354.000000

Volume Canadian Dollar

7902.440000

6214.000000

6909.860000

0.000000

82970.000000

Volume Euro Currency

13468.880000

10391.000000

17259.540000

6.000000

351187.000000

Volume Japanese Yen

12856.850000

8563.000000

14709.740000

7.000000

226166.000000

Volume Russian Ruble

5018.870000

2796.000000

5225.780000

0.000000

47247.000000

Volume Swiss Franc

8168.680000

6105.000000

7665.540000

0.000000

98763.000000

6

It should be noted that the Russian ruble had currency controls levied by the government until 2006.
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Log(Volume)Australian Dollar

7.792657

7.769801

0.982771

0.000000

11.409896

Log(Volume) British Pound

8.348629

8.372165

0.996711

1.098612

11.661466

Log(Volume) Brazilian Real

4.356071

4.537947

2.061767

0.000000

12.746517

Log(Volume) Canadian Dollar

8.657030

8.734721

0.920326

1.945910

11.326234

Log(Volume) Euro Currency

9.139480

9.248647

0.941483

1.791760

12.769074

Log(Volume) Japanese Yen

9.010977

9.055673

1.057654

1.945910

12.329025

Log(Volume) Russian Ruble

8.007806

7.937018

1.066479

2.708050

10.763144

Log(Volume) Swiss Franc

8.582162

8.717355

1.098639

1.386294

11.500478

4. Methodology

For my analysis I chose to use both a GARCH (1,1) model (with a constant term in the
mean equation) and a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) Model. The GARCH (1,1) model
can be defined as follows:
yt = µ + ε t , ε t I t −1 ~ N ( 0, ht )
ht = ω + αε t2−1 + β ht −1

The DCC model is merely an extension of the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) Model
(Engle (2002)). The main difference between the DCC model and the CCC model is that the
DCC model allows the correlation matrix to change over time. The DCC model is therefore
unique in that it retains the parsimony of a univariate GARCH model while incorporating a
GARCH-like, time varying correlation. Accordingly, the DCC can be written as:

H tDCC = Dt Rt Dt ,
Rt = diag{Qt }−1/ 2 Qt diag{Qt }−1/ 2 ,
Qt = S o (u '− A − B) + A o Z t −1Z t −1 '+ B o Qt −1 ,
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where Q+RSS is the covariance matrix for a vector of k asset returns, R is the possibly time-varying
correlation matrix, and

+

is the T @ T diagonal matrix of time-varying standard deviations from

a univariate GARCH model with UN/,+ on the  +V diagonal. W+  XY/Z,+ [ denotes the conditional
covariance matrix of the standardized residuals. In addition, A and B are parameter matrices and
o denotes the Hadamard matrix product operator, i.e. element-wise multiplication. The symbol 

denotes a vector of ones and S denotes the unconditional covariance matrix of the standardized
residuals. \+  X]/,+ [ is the standardized, but correlated, residual vector. Its conditional
correlation matrix is given by the variable Rt. For the  +V element of Rt, the conditional correlation
matrix is given by Y/Z,+ /UY//,+ YZZ,+ .

A simple DCC in a bivariate case would be

 q11,t
q
 12,t

 1
q12,t 
= (1 − a − b) 

q22,t 
 q12,t

q12,t 
 z1,2t −1
+a
1 
 z1,t −1 z2,t −1

z1,t −1 z2,t −1 
 q11,t −1
 +b
2
z2,t −1 
 q12,t −1

q12,t −1 
q22,t −1 

where a and b stand for the DCC parameters alpha and beta. In most cases, a and b can substitute
for more complicated matrices (e.g. A and B). Lastly, q
````
6P is the unconditional covariance of the
two standardized residuals.
The DCC model is constructed to permit a two-stage estimation of the conditional
covariance matrix Q+ . During the first step, a univariate volatility model is fitted for each of the
assets and the estimates of N/,+ are obtained. In the second step, the asset returns are transformed
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by their estimated standard deviations and used to estimate the parameters of the conditional
correlation.7

The log-likelihood function for the DCC model can be written as follows:

1
k log(2π ) + log H t + rt ' H t−1rt )
(
∑
2 t
1
= − ∑ ( k log(2π ) + log Dt Rt Dt + rt ' Dt−1 Rt−1 Dt−1r )
2 t
1
= − ∑ ( k log(2π ) + 2log Dt + log Rt + Z t ' H t−1Z t )
2 t

L=−

One can perform the estimation by means of a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) to
yield consistent parameter estimates. The log-likelihood function, which can be express as

L (θ1 ,θ 2 ) = LVol (θ1 ) + LCorr (θ1 ,θ 2 )

can be divided into two parts.
The volatility part:
LVol (θ1 ) = −

(

1
2
k log(2π ) + log Dt + rt ' Dt−2 rt
∑
2 t

)

And the correlation component:
LCorr (θ1 , θ 2 ) = −

7

1
log Rt + Z t ' Rt−1Z t − Z t ' Z t )
(
∑
2 t

The software used to estimation the DCC model is EViews.
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5. Empirical Results
A. Estimation of DCC Model

The estimate results for the DCC model are given in Table 4.The DCC beta parameter for
the Brazilian real is -0.9079 and the Russian ruble is -0.5178. Both the real and rubble have a
tendency to be near zero and often change signs—this may contribute to the negative betas for
the two currencies. The rest of the eight currencies have a positive DCC beta parameter. The
DCC beta parameter measures persistency of correlation and therefore better captures relative
stability. For example, the DCC beta parameter for the Euro is only 0.6073. Recall that the Euro
carries a 57.6% weight in the U.S. dollar index, which implies that a big currency like the Euro
naturally is more closely related to the index. Therefore, the fact that the Euro comes out with a
low persistency is even more clear evidence that its stability is low. On the other hand, the
weight for the Japanese yen, British pound, and Canadian dollar are 13.6%, 11.9%, and 9.1%
respectively; but the corresponding persistency of the correlation (the DCC beta parameter) is
0.9715, 0.9581, and 0.9837. This implies that the stability of the Japanese yen, British pound,
and Canadian dollar are relatively high. Figure 1 shows the dynamic conditional correlation
between each of the eight currencies with the U.S. dollar futures. Consistent with what has been
estimated from the DCC model (namely the DCC beta parameter) the conditional correlation,
noted as rho, between the Brazilian real and the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble and the U.S.
dollar have a tendency to be near zero and often change signs. Also, similar to the results of
Table 4, the Australian dollar, British pound, Canadian dollar, and Japanese yen are the most
positively correlated with U.S. dollar futures. One can observe that these relationships vary
dramatically over the sample period.
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Figure 1. Dynamic Conditional Correlation
Panel A. Correlation between Australian Dollar and American Dollar Futures

Panel B. Correlation between British Pound and American Dollar Futures
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Panel C. Correlation between Brazilian Real and American Dollar Futures

Panel D. Correlation between Canadian Dollar and American Dollar Futures
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Panel E. Correlation between Euro Currency and American Dollar Futures

Panel F. Correlation between Japanese Yen and American Dollar Futures
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Panel G. Correlation between Russia Ruble and American Dollar Futures

Panel H. Correlation between Swiss Franc and American Dollar Futures
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Table 4. DCC Model Results for Eight Currency Futures
Futures Contract

DCC α

Parameter

DCC β

Parameter

Correlation (Return)

Correlation (Volatility)

Log likelihood

Australian Dollar

0.0153***

(0.0026)

0.9832***

(0.0031)

-0.4766

-0.4710

-6279

British Pound

0.0331***

(0.0020)

0.9581***

(0.0029)

-0.7051

-0.7011

-5806

Brazilian Real

0.0069***

(0.0021)

-0.9079***

(0.2041)

0.0039

-0.0488

-6648

Canadian Dollar

0.0138***

(0.0031)

0.9837***

(0.0039)

-0.3767

-0.3641

-6433

Euro Currency

0.0728***

(0.0024)

0.6073***

(0.0079)

-0.9351

-0.9372

-4083

Japanese Yen

0.0253***

(0.0033)

0.9715***

(0.0041)

-0.4559

-0.4613

-6299

Russian Ruble

0.0304***

(0.0005)

-0.5178***

(0.0032)

0.0983

0.1043

-6638

Swiss Franc

0.0982***

(0.0073)

0.3075***

(0.0626)

-0.8860

-0.8834

-4791

B. The Role of Liquidity

Table 3, as previously stated, shows that liquidity varies across different currency futures.
Table 5 provides further evidence using the correlation matrix coefficients regarding return, the
time-varying correlation of currency futures and U.S. dollar index futures, and liquidity measures.
For all the currency futures, the Amihud illiquidity measure is negatively correlated with the
logarithm of trading volume.
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Table 5. Correlation Matrix of Correlation and Liquidity Measures

Return
Australian
Dollar
Correlation
Australian
Dollar
Amihud
Australian
Dollar
Log(Volume)
Australian
Dollar

Return
Brazalia
Ruble
Correlation
Brazalia
Ruble
Amihud
Brazalia
Ruble
Log(Volume)
Brazalia
Ruble

Return Euro
Currency
Correlation
Euro
Currency
Amihud Euro
Currency
Log(Volume)
Euro
Currency

Return
Russian
Ruble
Correlation
Russian
Ruble
Amihud
Russian
Ruble
Log(Volume)
Russian
Ruble

Return
Australian
Dollar

Correlation
Australian
Dollar

Amihud
Australian
Dollar

Log(Volume)
Australian
Dollar

1

0.00039

0.07506

-0.02918

Return
British Pound

1

0.08876

-0.18482

Correlation
British Pound

1

-0.48034

Amihud
British Pound

1

Log(Volume)
British Pound

Return
Brazalia
Ruble

Correlation
Brazalia
Ruble

Amihud
Brazalia
Ruble

Log(Volume)
Brazalia
Ruble

1

-0.02807

0.06981

-0.0321

1

-0.02921

0.02352

1

-0.73588

Return
Canadian
Dollar
Correlation
Canadian
Dollar
Amihud
Canadian
Dollar
Log(Volume)
Canadian
Dollar

1
Return
Euro
Currency

Correlation
Euro
Currency

Amihud
Euro
Currency

Log(Volume)
Euro
Currency

1

0.00832

0.01982

0.00742

Return
Japanese Yen

1

0.00893

-0.00907

Correlation
Japanese Yen

1

-0.35878

Amihud
Japanese Yen

1

Log(Volume)
Japanese Yen

Return
Russian
Ruble

Correlation
Russian
Ruble

Amihud
Russian
Ruble

Log(Volume)
Russian
Ruble

1

0.02585

0.06023

-0.04614

Return Swiss
Franc

1

-0.01413

0.02745

Correlation
Swiss Franc

1

-0.63667

Amihud
Swiss Franc

1

Log(Volume)
Swiss Franc
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Return
British
Pound

Correlation
British
Pound

Amihud
British
Pound

Log(Volume)
British Pound

1

-0.01089

0.05073

-0.03872

1

-0.17448

0.17887

1

-0.43617

1
Return
Canadian
Dollar

Correlation
Canadian
Dollar

Amihud
Canadian
Dollar

Log(Volume)
Canadian
Dollar

1

-0.01613

0.06774

-0.01738

1

-0.31254

0.28138

1

-0.44945

1
Return
Japanese
Yen

Correlation
Japanese
Yen

Amihud
Japanese
Yen

Log(Volume)
Japanese Yen

1

-0.00362

-0.01726

0.00674

1

-0.07844

0.15545

1

-0.47326
1

Return
Swiss
Franc

Correlation
Swiss Franc

Amihud
Swiss
Franc

Log(Volume)
Swiss Franc

1

0.01132

0.01745

-0.00377

1

0.0107

0.01341

1

-0.49249

1

For five out of eight currency futures, the correlation coefficient between the conditional
correlations and Amihud measure is negative, which implies that higher illiquidity promotes a
declining correlation between currency futures and U.S. dollar index futures. The exceptions are
the Australian dollar, Brazilian real, and Swiss franc futures. For these futures, higher illiquidity
actually promotes a closer conditional correlation between them and U.S. dollar index futures.
For six out of eight currency futures the correlation coefficient between the conditional
correlations and logarithm of trading volume is positive, which implies that more active trading
promotes a higher correlation between currency futures and U.S. dollar Index futures. The
exceptions are again the Australian dollar and the Brazilian real futures. For these futures, more
active trading is related with declaiming conditional correlation between them and U.S. dollar
index futures.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that liquidity does impacts the conditional
correlations. In order to examine this further, a regression approach is used to examine the extent
to which variations in the conditional correlations of currency futures and U.S. dollar index
futures are related to the different aspects of liquidity. More specifically, I run the following
regression:
rho = a + b1 × Amihud Illquidity + b2 × Log (trading volume) + ε
Table 6 shows how currency futures liquidity impacts the varied correlations between
currency futures and U.S. dollar futures. The dependent variable is the correlation (i.e. rho) is
estimated from the DCC model, while the independent variables are the Amihud illiquidity
measure as well as the logarithms of the trading volumes for each future. One very striking result
from Table 6 is that when the currency futures and U.S. dollar futures share a negative
relationship, the independent variables (Amihud illiquidity and trading volume) do not have
59

explanatory power in regards to the dynamic correlation. An example of this would include the
results for the Brazilian real and the Russian ruble. However, the liquidity measure does have
explanatory power for several positive correlations between currency futures and U.S. dollar,
such as the results for the Australian dollar, British pound, and the Canadian dollar.
Table 6. The Varying Correlations and Currency Futures Liquidity
Futures Contract

a

b1

b2

t-stat(a)

t-stat(b1)

t-stat(b2)

R-Square

Australian Dollar

-0.3383

-20.7353

-0.0255

-9.42

-0.80

-5.65

0.30

(0.0359)

(25.7881)

(0.0045)

-0.7805

152.9319

0.0061

-38.02

4.57

2.47

0.1810000

(0.0205)

(33.4766)

(0.0025)

-0.0494

0.0005

0.0001

-51.50

0.03

0.26

0.01

(0.0010)

(0.0181)

(0.0002)

-0.5807

272.1610

0.0191

-16.03

2.57

4.48

0.172

(0.0362)

(105.9979)

(0.0191)

-0.9182

311.7216

-0.0019

-43.08

1.13

-0.77

0.30

(0.0213)

(275.1507)

(0.0024)

-0.4531

-54.3483

-0.0063

-12.18

-0.33

-1.51

0.21

(0.0372)

(166.2133)

(0.0042)

0.1110

-201.2677

-0.0008

11.84

-1.65

-0.71

0.24

(0.0094)

(121.6324)

(0.0012)

-0.8919

2.5568

0.0011

-120.07

0.14

1.28

0.17

(0.0074)

(17.7233)

(0.0009)

British Pound

Brazilian Real

Canadian Dollar

Euro Currency

Japanese Yen

Russian Ruble

Swiss Franc

6. Conclusion

This study investigates the dynamic correlation between currency futures prices, focusing
on the persistency of correlation of currency prices. Using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation
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model developed by Engle (2002), this study incorporates time-varying correlations into the
analysis. The sample includes eight currency futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
from 1999 to 2008 and the U.S. dollar index futures. The study finds that the Canadian dollar has
the greater persistency while the Brazilian real has the weakest. No less important, the study
finds that the time-varying conditional correlation between currency futures and the U.S. dollar
futures is influenced by two types of liquidity: price impacts (Amihud illiquidity) and the
logarithm of trading volume.
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Appendix 1: Background Information of Each Currency

Australian Dollar
Beginning in 1966 the Australian dollar became the official currency of Australia. At that
time, the global currency market was managed under the Bretton Woods system. This system
operated throughcountries pegging their currency to the U.S. dollar (USD) by means of a fixed
exchange rate. When the Bretton Woods system finally collapsed it forced many countries to
adopt a floating rate of currency, including the Australian dollar in 1971. The Australian dollar’s
highest value relative to the USD was $0.881 in December of 1988. The lowest value was
$0.4775 in April of 2001. The Australian dollar is heavily influenced by Australia’s business
cycle, due to the fact that the Australian economy is so heavily reliant upon commodities. The
Australian dollar’s exchange rate movement is often opposite the direction to reserve currencies,
which tend to be stronger during downward turns of the business cycle.

British Pound
The British Pound has a long and distinguished history. In regards to its more recent
history the pound officially adopted a floating rate in August of 1971 after the end of the Bretton
Woods system. Later, in October of 1990 the British government joined the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM). However, Britain was forced to quit that system on “Black Wednesday”
(September 16, 1992) due to the fact that Britain’s economic performance made the exchange
rate unsustainable. As a member of the European Union, Britain retains the right to adopt the
euro as the country’s currency; however, the politics involved with such a decision are very
divisive. In April 2007 the pound hit a 15-year high against the USD with an exchange rate of $2
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USD to one British Pound. Since the global financial crisis of 2008 the pound has since
depreciated considerably.

Brazilian Real
The modern real was introduced in July of 1994 where it was set equal to 1 USD. The
new currency replaced the short-lived cruzeiro real (CR$). After its introduction, the real
unexpectedly gained value against the USD. During the 1994-1995 periods it attained its
maximum dollar value of $1.20. However, between 1996 and 1998 the Central Bank allowed the
real to depreciate in a slow and smooth manner, so that by the end of 1998 the exchange rate had
dropped from a 1:1 ratio to about a 1.2:1ratio. The currency's value continued a mostly
downwards path for the next four years. By October 2002 the exchange rate had reached an
historic low of almost 4 reals per 1 USD. In May 2007the real finally began to appreciate and
became valued at more than $0.50 - even though the Central Bank was still trying to keep the
exchange rate low. The Central Bank feared the effect that a rising exchange rate might have on
the Brazilian economy due to its reliance on exports.

Canadian Dollar
Unlike most currencies in the Bretton Woods system the Canadian dollar actually had a
floating exchange rate. This floating rate lasted from 1950 to 1962. In 1962 Canada decided to
switch to a fixed exchange rate, which was set at $0.925. However, with the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system it was forced to switch back to a floating rate in 1970. It has maintained a
floating exchange rate ever since. During the 1990’s the Canadian dollar fell in value against the
USD, and was traded for as little as $0.6179 on January 21, 2002. In more recent years its value
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has appreciated due to the demand for commodities which Canada exports. By September 28,
2007, the Canadian dollar had actually closed above the USD for the first time in 30 years at a
rate of $1.0052 to 1 Canadian dollar.

Euro Currency
The euro (€) is a currency currently used by 17 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. It is considered to be the second largest reserve currency
in the world as well as the second most traded currency in the world. The euro was originally
introduced as an accounting currency in January 1999. It was not until 2002 that actual paper
money and coinage was issued. Since 2002 the euro has traded above the USD with a high of
US$1.6038 on July 2008. While the euro has many strengths, a relative weakness has been the
low interest rates tied to the currency. These low interest rates allowed governments that use the
euro to borrow to excess, eventually causing public deficits to grow uncontrollable. Europe is
still dealing with its public debt issues.

Japanese Yen
After World War II, Japan needed help in stabilizing its economy. To that end Japan
joined the Bretton Wood System in 1949, whereupon it set the value of the yen at a fixed rate of
¥360 per 1 USD. This exchange rate remained in place until 1971, when the United States
abandoned the gold standard (thus triggering the end of the Bretton Woods System).Although the
yen has had a floating exchange rate since the early 1970’s, the Japanese government has
continuously interfered in the forex market by buying and selling USD in order to manipulate the
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country’s exchange rate. In the 1990’s the yen declined significantly against the dollar due to the
bursting of the Japanese asset price bubble, reaching a low of ¥134 to $1 in February of 2002. In
order to fight the downward pressure placed on the Japanese economy (from the bursting of the
bubble) the Bank of Japan adopted a zero interest rate policy. This has caused the yen to become
a major player in the carry trade market, since investors can borrow cheaply in yen and invest in
other currencies with higher interest rates. The yen continued its decline from the 1990’s all the
way until 2007when the bursting of another bubble, the U.S. housing market bubble, finally
caused the yen to appreciate.

Russian Ruble
Russia, over the years, has had many different rubles. The seventh version of the ruble
was issued on January of 1998, with one new ruble equaling 1,000 old rubles. This seventh ruble
was issued for purely psychological reasons. Regardless, the ruble was forced to depreciate
significantly in August 1998 due to the Russian Financial Crisis. During this period the ruble lost
almost 70% of its value against the USD. Since that time, the ruble has been doing better,
although inflation in Russian still undermines much of the value of the currency.

Swiss Franc
In 1945, Switzerland joined the Bretton Woods system and pegged the Swiss franc to the
USD at a rate of $1 = 4.30521 francs. Historically, the Swiss franc has been considered a safe
currency especially because (since the 1920’s) the Swiss franc was linked to gold. However, a
referendum held in May 2000 delinked the Swiss franc from its gold peg. Nevertheless, this
currency is still prized due to its extremely low inflation rates.
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Appendix 2: USDX Futures Contract Specifications
U.S. Dollar Index (USDX) Futures Specifications (as of June 30, 2002):
Contract size: $1000 times the USDX index.
Trading hours: 3:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and 8:05 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
Contract months: March, June, September, December
Ticker symbol: DX
Price quotation: The U.S. dollar index is quoted as a percent of its value as of March 1973,

calculated to two decimal places (e.g., on July 31, 2002, the USDX index officially closed at
107.41)
Minimum price fluctuation: The minimum price fluctuation, or “tick size” for the USDX index

is 0.01 USDX point, which is equivalent to $10.00 per futures contract.
Limit on daily price move: 200 ticks above & below prior day's settlement, except during last

30 minutes of any trading session when no limit applies. Should the price reach the limit and
remain within 100 ticks of the limit for 15 minutes, then new limits will be established 200 ticks
above and below the previous price limit
Position limits: None
Last day of trading: 2nd business day prior to the 3rd Wednesday of the expiring month. On the

last trading day, trading ceases at 10:16 a.m.
Settlement procedure: Contracts held to expiration are settled in cash, based on the value of the

USDX index at 10am (New York time) on the last day of trading for an expiring contract. The
USDX settlement value is computed by Reuters LTD, in accordance to New York Cotton
Exchange regulations.
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